Within the political science discourse, much ado has been made about the distinction between two, distinct dimensions of national attachment. Specifically, authors have identified latent orientations toward nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism is distinctly comparative; i.e. it serves to facilitate a largely vertical comparison of one’s own group vis-à-vis rival groups. Nationalistic comparison is the essence of realpolitik, or the critical factor facilitating a regime of international realism. Indeed, it was nationalism that enabled the French, reveling in an esprit de corps, to conquer much of Europe, before Napoleon was finally stopped at the Battle of Waterloo. During the first half the following century, nationalism again rose to fuel the armies of the Third Reich, the Kingdom of Italy, and Francoist Spain. Nationalism may in a more general sense be understood as a manifestation of social dominance orientation; i.e., the application of vertical comparisons between groups more generally (including but not limited to Westphalian nation-states). It implies “feelings of national superiority, of competitiveness with other nations, and the importance of power of other nations” (Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Nationalist fervor characteristically produces enhanced deference to national leaders and decreased tolerance of cultural or political heterogeneity. In sum, nationalism is constituted by all the things that make a good person wish humankind had never stumbled upon so foolish and senselessly destructive a notion as the nation.
Alternatively, patriotism is cast as a more benign, even beneficent, form of national attachment. Patriotism is the sentiment underlying such romantic notions as “all for one, and one for all”, and wells in the heart at the sound of songs extolling the virtues of shared sacrifice, altruism, and community values. Whereas nationalism is inherently comparative, patriotism is described as largely self-referential; its central preoccupations are not appeals to the national interest in an international order, but unqualified “love of country and its major symbols” (Sidanius et al 1997). In a functional sense, patriotism is understood as having more to do with pride in the well-keeping of society’s institutions, public well-being, and justice. Patriotism is at the heart of civic cooperation.
Whereas nationalism is said to rely on “blind attachment and uncritical conformity,” patriotism is rooted in a “critical understanding” of national values (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). It has therefore been associated with positive civic engagement, including efficacy, interest, and knowledge. Schatz et al account a ‘constructive’ role of patriotism, motivating honest, but necessary national self-criticism. To emphasize this point, the authors supply a quotation from the 19th century American statesman and reformer Carl Schurz. He asserts: “Our country right or wrong! When right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right!”.
In this view, critical discussion of a society’s political and social institutions is an expression of patriotism. This proposition seems strikingly at odds with the requirements of nationalism, which may be construed as demanding unqualified support for the nation’s policies, and ‘blind’ adherence to certain fundamental assumptions about the inherent superiority of the nation’s practices and conditions. Indeed, nationalists are prone to regarding criticism of leaders (especially in dealings with out-groups), as traitorous. In order to better establish this contrast, Schatz et al draw upon 19th century thinker Stephen Decatur, who writes: “Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right, but our country right or wrong.”
To many scholars, nationalism and patriotism seem so incommensurable, that they often regarded as constituting two orthogonal dimensions of national attachment. In other words, they posit that in order to properly capture the character of a given individual’s national attachment it’s necessary to take two measurements: nationalist and patriotic orientations. Adding additional dimensionality is a move scientists don’t take likely. As a general scientific precept, models should be as simple as possible, while still sufficiently complex to explain the phenomenon being modeled. In this case, I think a unidimensional model may be dismissed prematurely. To support this claim, I’ll draw upon two relevant considerations.
First, I’ll highlight a social identity theory of national attachment assembled by Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib. Their social identity approach offers an alternative approach to measuring national attachment, loading on empirically distinguishable factors. A conceptually more elegant model of attachment, their national identity scales pick up on an individual’s sense of belonging to a larger social unit, and further the importance s/he assigns to that belonging. This measure has two key advantages over competing measures. Specifically, it significantly predicts civic engagement behaviors, such as attention to politics, knowledge, and voting. As well, it’s neutral with respect political ideology. Most importantly, I admire this measure for its simplicity, demanding the minimum of cognitive or intellectual assumptions of individuals: it’s simply a measure of attachment. Yet these authors still maintain that it’s still necessary to employ a second measure of ‘uncritical patriotism’ (i.e. nationalism), in order to capture a broader array of political behavior such as out-group aggression and deference to established authorities. As I’d suggested previously, I believe this conclusion is premature. That being said, the national identity remains the cleanest, most parsimonious, and intuitive measure. The problem lies not with the inadequacy of the measure, but rather the failure to consider a potentially critical factor moderating its expression.
I contend that this factor is altruism. Though a novel concept in the political psychology of nationalism, evolutionary psychological and behavioral economic research have established altruism as a foundation for social cooperation. It’s principle relevance here is that it offers of an explanation of why two people, perhaps equally indentifying with a nation, may differ significantly in their respective levels of civic engagement. Civic engagement is a fundamentally an individually costly behavior. Becoming politically knowledgeable takes time away from family and other more enjoyable activities, and may entail sacrifices like forgoing lucrative careers in favor of earning degrees in political science. Moreover, employing such knowledge to critically examine dominant regimes can put one at odds with the authorities, employers, and even one’s peers. One does not stake out socially and politically contrarian positions lightly, as there will inevitably be personal consequences. Challenging prevailing norms and values frequently results in social punishment, ranging from diminished social status to ostracism and even violence. Some extreme examples of the latter might include the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Harvey Milk. These are the sort of individuals who are likely to subscribe to Mahatma Ganhdi’s dictum, “Even if you are a minority of one, the truth is the truth”. By controverting socially established truth by staking a position one believes to be the better representation of actual truth, one places themselves at odds with their community, but on its behalf.
Essentially what I’m proposing is an interactive model of national attachment and altruism. At high levels of altruism, I expect to see a greater effect of national attachment on political participation and knowledge. Alternatively, at low levels of altruism I expect the opposite. Simply put, those high in national attachment will make little effort to educate themselves on matters or stake out positions for which they’re likely to rub their respective communities the wrong ways. For them personally, it would be more profitable to simply adhere to the established norms and beliefs of their community. Such a condition may be likened to a form of patriotic apathy.
However, this may yet leave the forms of aggression we sometimes observe directed at a regime’s critics unexplained, as it is also costly. In the evolutionary psychological and behavioral economic literatures, the term ‘altruistic punishment’ is used to describe the individually costly behaviors some individuals choose to direct at other in-group in response to perceived group-threatening or weakening behaviors. Such behavior is considered ‘altruistic’ because, while costly for both the punisher and the one getting punished, the group as a whole benefits. With this in mind, we should also expect high levels of altruism to be associated with a high tendency to punish social critics, or deviants, especially at high levels of national attachment. So will high altruism and high national attachment be manifest as revolutionary or counterrevolutionary behavior? I contend that ‘authoritarianism’ is a critical factor moderating this interaction; i.e. I’m proposing a three-way interaction between national attachment, altruism, and authoritarianism. At low levels of authoritarianism, I expect high identifying altruists to engage in more social criticism; contrariwise, at high levels I expect more aggression directed at those who are critical.
The advantage of this model is that it’s constituted from three, very basic and essentially orthogonal group orientations. At the same time, it may explain quite a bit. The tables below show a complete breakdown of expected patterns.
High national attachment
|
| High authoritarianism | Low authoritarianism |
| High altruism | Altruistic punishers | Revolutionaries |
| Low altruism | Apathetic conformists | Apathetic patriots |
Low national attachment
|
| High authoritarianism | Low authoritarianism |
| High altruism | Neo-nazism, Salafism, sectarian radicals, communists, | Global humanism |
| Low altruism | Sectarian conformists | Recluse |
In conclusion, I’ve suggested an alternative approach to understanding the diverse ways in which patriotism can be expressed, while appealing to only a single model of national attachment. This approach relies only on basic group orientations, thus minimizing the number of assumptions one has to make about individuals’ attitudes. The model yields empirically testable hypotheses, and could probably be tested with readily available data, such as the General Social Survey or the American National Elections Studies survey.
No comments:
Post a Comment