A novel approach to the study of nationalism

Within the political science discourse, much ado has been made about the distinction between two, distinct dimensions of national attachment. Specifically, authors have identified latent orientations toward nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism is distinctly comparative; i.e. it serves to facilitate a largely vertical comparison of one’s own group vis-à-vis rival groups. Nationalistic comparison is the essence of realpolitik, or the critical factor facilitating a regime of international realism. Indeed, it was nationalism that enabled the French, reveling in an esprit de corps, to conquer much of Europe, before Napoleon was finally stopped at the Battle of Waterloo. During the first half the following century, nationalism again rose to fuel the armies of the Third Reich, the Kingdom of Italy, and Francoist Spain. Nationalism may in a more general sense be understood as a manifestation of social dominance orientation; i.e., the application of vertical comparisons between groups more generally (including but not limited to Westphalian nation-states). It implies “feelings of national superiority, of competitiveness with other nations, and the importance of power of other nations” (Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Nationalist fervor characteristically produces enhanced deference to national leaders and decreased tolerance of cultural or political heterogeneity. In sum, nationalism is constituted by all the things that make a good person wish humankind had never stumbled upon so foolish and senselessly destructive a notion as the nation.

Alternatively, patriotism is cast as a more benign, even beneficent, form of national attachment. Patriotism is the sentiment underlying such romantic notions as “all for one, and one for all”, and wells in the heart at the sound of songs extolling the virtues of shared sacrifice, altruism, and community values. Whereas nationalism is inherently comparative, patriotism is described as largely self-referential; its central preoccupations are not appeals to the national interest in an international order, but unqualified “love of country and its major symbols” (Sidanius et al 1997). In a functional sense, patriotism is understood as having more to do with pride in the well-keeping of society’s institutions, public well-being, and justice. Patriotism is at the heart of civic cooperation.

Whereas nationalism is said to rely on “blind attachment and uncritical conformity,” patriotism is rooted in a “critical understanding” of national values (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999). It has therefore been associated with positive civic engagement, including efficacy, interest, and knowledge. Schatz et al account a ‘constructive’ role of patriotism, motivating honest, but necessary national self-criticism. To emphasize this point, the authors supply a quotation from the 19^th century American statesman and reformer Carl Schurz. He asserts: “Our country right or wrong! When right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right!”.

In this view, critical discussion of a society’s political and social institutions is an expression of patriotism. This proposition seems strikingly at odds with the requirements of nationalism, which may be construed as demanding unqualified support for the nation’s policies, and ‘blind’ adherence to certain fundamental assumptions about the inherent superiority of the nation’s practices and conditions. Indeed, nationalists are prone to regarding criticism of leaders (especially in dealings with out-groups), as traitorous. In order to better establish this contrast, Schatz et al draw upon 19^th century thinker Stephen Decatur, who writes: “Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right, but our country right or wrong.”

To many scholars, nationalism and patriotism seem so incommensurable, that they often regarded as constituting two orthogonal dimensions of national attachment. In other words, they posit that in order to properly capture the character of a given individual’s national attachment it’s necessary to take two measurements: nationalist and patriotic orientations. Adding additional dimensionality is a move scientists don’t take likely. As a general scientific precept, models should be as simple as possible, while still sufficiently complex to explain the phenomenon being modeled. In this case, I think a unidimensional model may be dismissed prematurely. To support this claim, I’ll draw upon two relevant considerations.

First, I’ll highlight a social identity theory of national attachment assembled by Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib. Their social identity approach offers an alternative approach to measuring national attachment, loading on empirically distinguishable factors. A conceptually more elegant model of attachment, their national identity scales pick up on an individual’s sense of belonging to a larger social unit, and further the importance s/he assigns to that belonging. This measure has two key advantages over competing measures. Specifically, it significantly predicts civic engagement behaviors, such as attention to politics, knowledge, and voting. As well, it’s neutral with respect political ideology. Most importantly, I admire this measure for its simplicity, demanding the minimum of cognitive or intellectual assumptions of individuals: it’s simply a measure of attachment. Yet these authors still maintain that it’s still necessary to employ a second measure of ‘uncritical patriotism’ (i.e. nationalism), in order to capture a broader array of political behavior such as out-group aggression and deference to established authorities. As I’d suggested previously, I believe this conclusion is premature. That being said, the national identity remains the cleanest, most parsimonious, and intuitive measure. The problem lies not with the inadequacy of the measure, but rather the failure to consider a potentially critical factor moderating its expression.

I contend that this factor is altruism. Though a novel concept in the political psychology of nationalism, evolutionary psychological and behavioral economic research have established altruism as a foundation for social cooperation. It’s principle relevance here is that it offers of an explanation of why two people, perhaps equally indentifying with a nation, may differ significantly in their respective levels of civic engagement. Civic engagement is a fundamentally an individually costly behavior. Becoming politically knowledgeable takes time away from family and other more enjoyable activities, and may entail sacrifices like forgoing lucrative careers in favor of earning degrees in political science. Moreover, employing such knowledge to critically examine dominant regimes can put one at odds with the authorities, employers, and even one’s peers. One does not stake out socially and politically contrarian positions lightly, as there will inevitably be personal consequences. Challenging prevailing norms and values frequently results in social punishment, ranging from diminished social status to ostracism and even violence. Some extreme examples of the latter might include the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Harvey Milk. These are the sort of individuals who are likely to subscribe to Mahatma Ganhdi’s dictum, “Even if you are a minority of one, the truth is the truth”. By controverting socially established truth by staking a position one believes to be the better representation of actual truth, one places themselves at odds with their community, but on its behalf.

Essentially what I’m proposing is an interactive model of national attachment and altruism. At high levels of altruism, I expect to see a greater effect of national attachment on political participation and knowledge. Alternatively, at low levels of altruism I expect the opposite. Simply put, those high in national attachment will make little effort to educate themselves on matters or stake out positions for which they’re likely to rub their respective communities the wrong ways. For them personally, it would be more profitable to simply adhere to the established norms and beliefs of their community. Such a condition may be likened to a form of patriotic apathy.

However, this may yet leave the forms of aggression we sometimes observe directed at a regime’s critics unexplained, as it is also costly. In the evolutionary psychological and behavioral economic literatures, the term ‘altruistic punishment’ is used to describe the individually costly behaviors some individuals choose to direct at other in-group in response to perceived group-threatening or weakening behaviors. Such behavior is considered ‘altruistic’ because, while costly for both the punisher and the one getting punished, the group as a whole benefits. With this in mind, we should also expect high levels of altruism to be associated with a high tendency to punish social critics, or deviants, especially at high levels of national attachment. So will high altruism and high national attachment be manifest as revolutionary or counterrevolutionary behavior? I contend that ‘authoritarianism’ is a critical factor moderating this interaction; i.e. I’m proposing a three-way interaction between national attachment, altruism, and authoritarianism. At low levels of authoritarianism, I expect high identifying altruists to engage in more social criticism; contrariwise, at high levels I expect more aggression directed at those who are critical.

The advantage of this model is that it’s constituted from three, very basic and essentially orthogonal group orientations. At the same time, it may explain quite a bit. The tables below show a complete breakdown of expected patterns.

High national attachment

	High authoritarianism	Low authoritarianism
High altruism	Altruistic punishers	Revolutionaries
Low altruism	Apathetic conformists	Apathetic patriots

Low national attachment

	High authoritarianism	Low authoritarianism
High altruism	Neo-nazism, Salafism, sectarian radicals, communists,	Global humanism
Low altruism	Sectarian conformists	Recluse

In conclusion, I’ve suggested an alternative approach to understanding the diverse ways in which patriotism can be expressed, while appealing to only a single model of national attachment. This approach relies only on basic group orientations, thus minimizing the number of assumptions one has to make about individuals’ attitudes. The model yields empirically testable hypotheses, and could probably be tested with readily available data, such as the General Social Survey or the American National Elections Studies survey.

Some thoughts on the psychology of threat

Much research in political psychology explores the implications of threat perception on intergroup relations. The first supposition of this research is the notion that threat perception may be broken down into categories of threat. Perhaps the most common distinction is made between so-called “realistic” and cultural threat. Realistic threat, much like cousin realpolitik, implies a threat to basic material security or livelihoods. Consistent with a Maslowovian “hierarchy of needs” framework, material security is seen as a perquisite for all other concerns, and is thus a more primary category of threat—perhaps second only to direct, physical and/or mortal danger. The latter category is treated under the rubric of ‘terror management’. In research, this is frequently operationalized as activation of awareness of one’s mortality and vulnerability to physical harm. Cultural threat, or threat to one’s values, community norms, and the such, tends to be viewed more as largely symbolic—potentially correlated with some deeper, physical or material concern—but not a genuine threat in and of itself. For this reason, cultural threat is frequently treated unjustified and evident of some underlying racist disposition.

The empirical research finds a general pattern in individual responses to threat perception, more or less valid across these three categories. In particular, individuals’ orientations toward their in-groups are enhanced. They may become increasingly hostile against in-group members who are seen as violating their group’s norms of conduct and attitude, or otherwise challenging fundamental aspects of the group’s self-image, esteem, values, or actions. This may include anger at members of subaltern sub-groups conducting themselves in ways more consistent with those of dominant sub-group; i.e., a black male behaving stereotypically ‘white’ may be perceived as a structural impurity in an established social order. As well, individuals may become more hostile, or at least averse, toward out-group members. Various individual levels factors have been shown to moderate these effects, such as individual self-esteem and education. Threats may be perceived as primarily focused on individuals themselves, or as collective threats to the groups they identify with. Consequently, another factor shown to influence dynamics of threat response is activation of group identities. While terror management, in general, leads to predictions of increased insularity, activation of group identities streamlines pathways toward out-group denigration.

One aspect of this research that I find suspect is the tendency to treat cultural threat as a distinct process. The capacity to produce and transmit culture is a key faculty with which human beings respond to challenges from their environment. This faculty is the predominant function of the human being’s proportionally large cerebral cortex, especially the neocortex. In much the same way as rhinoceros achieves relies upon its bulk and armor to secure it’s physical and material security, or the lion it’s jaws, human beings rely upon culture to secure these ends. Our ancestors survived material scarcity and a violent environment precisely by banding together and resolving these challenges through collective action. Culture facilitates collective action by establishing a groundwork for communication and behavioral institutions that alter nature’s payoff calculus rewarding contribution to public goods and punishing free-riding. Therefore, it isn’t surprising we see an increased focus on in-group orientation under physical and material threat, for it’s the presence of such threats for which we have groups. In terms of game theory, they payoff matrix is adjusted to favor cooperation at the equilibrium. Absent threats, individualism prevails as the most profitable disposition.

Accordingly, I take issue with research designs in which individuals are isolated from one another, as in a laboratory cubicle. The very act of engagement with other people, I strongly suspect, activates group identity. Communication is replete—perhaps even constituted from—shared cultural symbols and representations. We might forget this as we are accustomed to interacting primarily with other political scientists on a daily basis. We are all similarly educated, come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and have all adopted lexicons, phonics, and mannerisms which unmistakably convey our belonging. So ubiquitous are these traits that we generally fail to discern them; i.e., take their immediacy and prevalence for granted. These traits, however, are drawn in sharp relief when we interact with the local Long Islanders, undergraduates, most blacks and Hispanics (excluding those who have joined our ranks and adopted our customs). In such a context, class and racial boundaries between us inevitably become salient and active. In the real world (outside of the laboratory), such cues occur implicitly, and are probably accompanied by explicit cues. For example, I find it unlikely than at many dinner tables where economic issues are regularly discussed racial issues don’t arise from time to time. If not at the dinner table, then at the water cooler. If not at the water cooler, then on the news. If not on the news, then at the pub, golf course, with neighbors out mowing their lawn, and so forth.

The heart of my criticism is that by isolating individuals in a cubicle and questioning them in such a way so as to avoid activation of group identities, we aren’t teasing out subtle distinctions between different threat-response mechanisms, we’re tying an individual’s primary threat-response mechanism behind his back and watching him squirm. This is meaningful in the same way it’s meaningful to muzzle a dog and observe that he doesn’t bark, or clipping a robin’s wings and observing how it doesn’t fly. The neocortex, comprising some 90% of cerebral cortex, is no less characteristic trait of the human being than those from these examples. From this perspective, observations such as increased in-group orientation in the presence of mortal or material threat is akin to readying the jaws or spreading wings. The human being is preparing itself to respond to a threat with the tools evolution has provided for him; i.e., he’s affirming the salient identity through enhanced conformity to expectations of behavior and attitude. He’s propping up group cohesion by increasing vigilance against social deviance and when necessary administering punishment at personal cost. In such scenarios, his survival depends more on group cohesion than it does being right. This might be understood as differential risk-benefit ratios associated with type 1 and type 2 errors: if the group is misapprehends the nature or severity of the threat (type 1 error), an over response at the price of individual liberty or autonomy may be a bargain next to the potentially catastrophic consequences of dismissing a genuine threat as false. The evolutionarily adaptive solution, thus, is to systematically overreact to threat—not unlike the snapping dog or flighty bird—but to engage cultural structures.

With the above argument, I content that culture-driven or otherwise ethnocentric responses to threat are inseparable. I will now extend these remarks and argue that the very presence of cultural diversity is inherently threatening to material and mortal security. Again, I argue that culture is the primary tool with which human beings respond to adaptive problems from their environment. Accordingly, the sets of attitudes, norms, symbols, representations, and values constituting a culture are by design reflective of the environment; they are custom designed cognitive software facilitating optimal cognitive mediation between individuals, others, and their environments. Cultural evolution is studied at length in other disciplines. It’s real, and it follows the same essential principles as biological evolution: nature selects on adaptive fitness, or in alternatively the environment selects on cultural objects that enhance individual and possibly group fitness. Thus, the cultural canon of a society is a precious resource. To put this in perspective, we should consider how useful our urbane and cosmopolitan New Yorker habits would be in polar Greenland. The body of knowledge and skills enabling the Inuit inhabitants of that region of the world to survive enables them to cope, where we would surely die. Thus, any threat to that body of knowledge—that culture—is inherently threatening on a material or mortal level.

Invasive ideas can be either beneficial or detrimental. However, given that native ideas are already likely to be of a high suitability to the environment, it’s probably more likely that a foreign custom is detrimental rather than beneficial. Further, there are group-cohesive advantages to conformity in and of itself (even to sub-optimal customs). Thus, survival itself demands an innate conservativeness with respect to foreign ideas and customs. Culture is a precious asset. Sullying it with foreign ideas potentially undermines its fit with the environment and social integrity, leaving a group weakened and more vulnerable to ecological threats and other groups. The presence of imminent dangers raises the stakes associated with cultural innovation, diminishing the benefits and magnifying the risks. Consequently, it isn’t surprising we see enhanced punishment of social deviance under threat. Conversely, it’s only in times of relative peace and security that the potential benefits of cultural innovation, or liberalism, stand to outweigh the risks.

In this essay, I’ve argued that culture is an integral element of the human being’s threat-response toolkit. Any attempt to suppress the activation of cultural identities in a laboratory undermines external validity. The notion of cultural threat as distinct from material or mortal threat is established on a false dichotomy. Thus, threats to culture aren’t merely symbolic; they constitute genuine threats to a human being’s physical security and wellbeing. Political psychologists should focus not on when cultural identities are activated, but why certain identities are activated in a particular sociopolitical context. Such understanding can lead to enlightened social policy that enhances cultural affinity among a heterogeneous population and diminishes sectarianism.